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RESISTING THE PATH OF LEAST 
RESISTANCE: WHY THE TEXAS “POLE TAX” 
AND THE NEW CLASS OF MODERN SIN 
TAXES ARE BAD POLICY 
Rachel E. Morse* 
Abstract: Sin taxes—traditionally levied on alcohol and tobacco—are in-
herently regressive and disproportionately burden the poor, yet they are 
firmly entrenched as a practice and offer a quick fix in times of fiscal 
need. Opponents to this method of generating revenue cite its regressive 
nature and argue that sin taxes are paternalistic and bad social policy. 
Others disagree, contending that smokers need every incentive to quit, or 
that alcoholics should be required to mitigate the social costs of their 
habit. In recent years, a new class of sin taxes has reached deeper into 
popular culture than ever before, confusing the basic role of the tax sys-
tem with the improper role of government as social engineer. This Note 
argues that the use of new sin taxes must be curbed in order to protect 
the political and socio-economic minorities who consistently face a dis-
proportionate burden under every new sin tax. 
Introduction 
 In every community those who feel the burdens of taxation are naturally 
prone to relieve themselves from them if they can . . . . One class struggles to 
throw the burden off its own shoulders. If they succeed, of course it must fall 
upon others. They also, in their turn, labor to get rid of it, and finally the 
load falls upon those who will not, or cannot, make a successful effort for 
relief. This is, in general, a one-sided struggle, in which only the rich en-
gage, and it is a struggle in which the poor always go to the wall.1 
 
 In 2007, the Texas state legislature passed a law imposing a five 
dollar per-customer tax on strip clubs.2 The tax, which went into ef-
fect on January 1, 2008, was expected to affect approximately 150 
                                                                                                                      
* Note Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2008–2009). 
1 William B. Barker, The Three Faces of Equality: Constitutional Requirements in Taxation, 57 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2006). 
2 Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 47(B) (2008). 
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businesses in the state and generate an additional forty million dollars 
a year in revenue.3 Although the proceeds were earmarked for a no-
ble cause—a portion of the money was designated for use in funding 
programs for victims of sexual assault—the tax was decried as uncon-
stitutional and discriminatory, and has met opposition from club 
owners, patrons, employees, and even some legal scholars.4 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Texas Slaps “Pole Tax” on Strip Clubs, Int’l Herald Trib. Online, Dec. 21, 2007, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/21/america/Texas-Strip-Club-Tax.php; Emily 
Ramshaw, Strip Bars May Face State Fees, Dallas Morning News, Feb. 13, 2007, at 1A. Al-
though it is unknown exactly how many strip clubs exist in Texas, there are 152 “sexually 
oriented businesses” registered with the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission. See Ram-
shaw, supra. The revenue estimates are based on established figures from liquor sales and 
indicate that the registered clubs are host to approximately eight million visits a year. See 
Texas Slaps “Pole Tax” on Strip Clubs, supra. 
4 See Texas Slaps “Pole Tax” on Strip Clubs, supra note 3. Almost immediately after the law 
took effect, the Texas Entertainment Association—a business group comprised of adult 
entertainment and cabaret venues—filed suit, charging that the tax violates their First 
Amendment right to freedom of expression. See Texas Strip Clubs Alter Argument Against $5-
Per-Customer-Fee, Dallas Morning News Online, Dec. 27, 2007, http://www.dallasnews. 
com/sharedcontent/dws/news/texassouthwest/stories/122807dntexstripclubfee.4c5a252.
html. The plaintiffs won their first battle when, in March 2008, a Texas state district court 
judge ruled that the tax was unconstitutional. See Christy Hoppe, Strip Clubs Still Might Have 
to Pay Disputed Fee, Dallas Morning News, Apr. 18, 2008, at 3A. However, the state district 
court’s judgment was automatically suspended when the Texas Attorney General’s Office 
filed an appeal. See id. Subsequently, the Texas Comptroller mailed a letter explaining to 
strip clubs that their payments were still due. See id. The Supreme Court has held that 
nude dancing “is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment.” 
See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991). However, the Court has also upheld 
laws banning nudity, stating that while nude dancing is protected expression, it is “only 
marginally so,” and there are different levels of protection due different forms of expres-
sive conduct. See id.; see also City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 278–79 (2000) (uphold-
ing a local ordinance making it illegal to knowingly or intentionally appear nude in pub-
lic—thus effectively requiring nude dancers to wear, at minimum, pasties and a G-string—
on the grounds that the ordinance was a valid content-neutral restriction on immoral con-
duct). In addition to the First Amendment, the tax is also being opposed on other 
grounds. See Corrie MacLaggan, State Defends Strip Club Fee in Court Filing, Austin Am. 
Statesman, Dec. 18, 2007, at B1. Laura Stein, a communications professor at the Univer-
sity of Texas has predicted the tax “is not going to stand or fall based on First Amendment 
questions. The stronger issue here is whether this is unfair taxation.” See id. The suit also 
alleges that the law imposes an occupation tax in violation of the state constitution, and 
that it falsely suggests a connection between the adult entertainment industry and sexual 
violence. See Texas Slaps “Pole Tax” on Strip Clubs, supra note 3. Jonathan Turley, a constitu-
tional law professor at George Washington University, has suggested the Texas tax could 
pave the way for punitive taxes in an array of unpopular or borderline arenas, going as far 
as to suggest that abortion could be made subject to a sin tax. See Texas Strip Clubs Alter 
Argument Against $5-Per-Customer Fee, supra; Texas Slaps “Pole Tax” on Strip Clubs, supra note 3. 
The club owners further allege that the tax will drive some smaller bars out of business. See 
Texas Slaps “Pole Tax” on Strip Clubs, supra note 3. Dawn Rizos, operator of the Dallas club, 
The Lodge, told the Associated Press she expects the tax “will kill some of the smaller 
clubs.” Id. Chandra Brown, president of the company that owns Players, a small Amarillo 
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 Dubbed the “Texas ‘Pole’ Tax,” this levy on strip clubs is one of a 
new set of modern sin taxes that has been imposed on a wide range of 
activities in recent years.5 Sin taxes—targeted excise taxes imposed on 
the sale of disfavored goods or services—are not uncommon; the 
United States has a history of taxing vices such as alcohol and tobacco 
in order to generate revenue in times of war, or to raise money for 
education.6 Although sin taxes are generally proposed in times of fis-
cal need, lawmakers often justify them by citing moral concerns.7 The 
argument posits that a given activity, such as smoking, is bad for soci-
ety.8 By raising taxes on cigarettes, lawmakers force smokers to inter-
nalize the costs of their habit and will perhaps discourage some peo-
ple from purchasing cigarettes altogether.9 But while discouraging 
anti-social or destructive behavior is a desirable goal, sin taxes are not 
                                                                                                                      
club, stated that adding a five dollar tax to the existing four dollar cover that her club cur-
rently charges will “drive away customers and force the club to close.” Id. Brown believes 
her customers can not afford the surcharge and will refuse to pay it. Id. 
5 See Texas Slaps “Pole Tax” on Strip Clubs, supra note 3. Other new taxes involve video 
games, junk food, bottled water, sugary soda and ammunition. See David Cox, Assemblymem-
ber Cox 5th District Report, Vol. 1, Issue 2, Apr. 2002 (listing new tax proposals in California, 
including an ammunition tax, proposed by state senator Don Perata (D-Oakland) that would 
place a five-cent tax on every cartridge or round of ammunition sold in the state); John P. 
Gamboa, Sin Taxes Give the Market a Bad Rap, Daily Aztec, Jan. 30, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.thedailyaztec.com/2.7447/1.794878 (describing proposals in New Mexico and 
Wisconsin to tax video games, TVs and electronics); Dan Shapley, An Eco-Sin Tax on Bottled 
Water, Daily Green, Dec. 24, 2007, http://www.thedailygreen.com/environmental-
news/latest/bottled-water-tax-47122402 (describing Chicago as “the first major U.S. city to 
tax bottled water,” beginning in 2008); Robert A. Sirico, Commentary: Twinkies, Smokes and 
Fries: The Fallacies of Sin Taxes, Budget & Tax News, Sept. 2006, available at 
http://www.heartland.org/policybot/results.html?articleid=19660 (describing recent pro-
posals for “new and creative measures aimed at fatty snacks, fast food, and soft drinks”); John 
Skorburg, Oakland Mayor Floats Sin Taxes on Junk Food and Drinking, Budget & Tax News, 
Feb. 2004, available at http://www.heartland.org/policybot/results.html?artId= 
14343 (referencing a recommendation by the mayor of Oakland, California, that the state 
address budget problems “by taxing behaviors such as drinking and eating junk food”). 
6 See David J. DePippo, I’ll Take My Sin Taxes Unwrapped and Maximized, with a Side of Ine-
lasticity, Please, 36 U. Rich. L. Rev. 543, 544 (2002); Texas Slaps “Pole Tax” on Strip Clubs, 
supra note 3. 
7 See Jendi B. Reiter, Essay, Citizens or Sinners? The Economic and Political Inequity of “Sin 
Taxes” on Tobacco and Alcohol Products, 29 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 443, 451 (1996); Skor-
burg, supra note 5. 
8 See Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing the “Fat Tax”: The Role of Food Taxes in Developed Econo-
mies, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1221, 1247 (2005) (describing a cigarette tax as a surrogate self-
control device for smokers who know they should quit, but do not seem able to do so on 
their own). 
9 See id. 
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an appropriate remedy for societal ills.10 Sin taxes are inherently re-
gressive; they put a disproportionate burden on the poor, and they 
can create more problems than they solve.11 Not only do sin taxes 
burden the individual consumer, but they also jeopardize small busi-
nesses and promote unfair competition, and can lead to downsizing 
and layoffs for workers.12 In an effort to stamp out one particular ac-
tivity, sin taxes may encourage smuggling and create violent black 
markets, especially when the item being taxed is available for less in a 
neighboring city or state.13 There is often considerable class bias in-
fluencing the decision of which activities to tax; the bulk of things 
subject to this extra burden are those most popular with the poor and 
working classes.14 
 Although sin taxes burden the poor and working classes dispro-
portionately, they tend to be billed as being for the greater good. Sin 
taxes are often linked to programs purported to cure the ills caused 
by the activity being taxed, and are widely accepted by the general 
public because they are indirect taxes that affect only a select minor-
ity.15 When lawmakers impose a new sin tax, those who otherwise op-
pose taxation tend to look the other way.16 Supporters of increased 
cigarette taxes, for example, argue that smoking imposes great costs 
on society, such as increased healthcare costs and harm done to those 
                                                                                                                      
10 See Phineas Baxandall, Taxing Habits, 13 Fed. Res. Bank of Boston Regional Rev. 
19, 26 (2003); Robert A. Sirico, Sin Taxes: Inferior Revenue Sources, Budget & Tax News, July 
2004, available at http://www.heartland.org/policybot/results.html?artId=15293. 
11 See Baxandall, supra note 10, at 26; Reiter, supra note 7, at 447; Sirico, supra note 10. 
12 See D. Dowd Muska, Sin Tax Error, Nev. J. (1999), available at http://nj.npri.org/ 
nj99/05/feature2.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2008); Sirico, supra note 10. 
13 See Muska, supra note 12. “In the late 1980s, Canada attempted a large luxury tax on 
cigarettes, only to find that a substantial and violent black market soon formed to supply 
smokers. Legal sales (and tax revenues) fell, while more money had to be re-routed to stop 
the criminal activity.” See Luxury Tax, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ 
l/luxury_tax.asp (last visited Dec. 4, 2008). 
14 See Baxandall, supra note 10, at 26; DePippo, supra note 6, at 555; Reiter, supra note 
7, at 454. Baxandall cites a 1990 study by Harvard Law School Professor Kip Viscusi in 
which Viscusi determines that the poor do smoke more than the affluent. See Baxendall, 
supra note 10. According to Viscusi’s findings, over thirty percent of smokers earned less 
than $10,000 a year. See id. 
15 See Gamboa, supra note 5 (explaining that New Mexico’s proposed “Leave No Child 
Inside” campaign includes a plan to spend money raised by the video game tax on outdoor 
education programs); Texas Slaps “Pole Tax” on Strip Clubs, supra note 3 (detailing the plan 
for money raised by the strip club tax to go towards helping victims of sexual violence). 
Discussed further in section IV, these links, while well-intentioned, are often misguided. See 
Gamboa, supra note 5. 
16 See Gamboa, supra note 5. 
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who are exposed to second hand smoke.17 A tobacco tax forces smok-
ers to help defray these costs that might otherwise fall to the state.18 
Proponents also argue that an extra charge for cigarettes might be the 
incentive an otherwise educated addict needs to finally quit her un-
healthy habit.19 And although sin taxes are not without problems, they 
are such an integral part of the revenue system that many state budg-
ets are now largely dependent on the money they bring in.20 
 Yet while sin taxes are an established mechanism for solving 
budget crises and influencing behavior, commentators have long 
voiced concern about an eventual slide down a slippery slope into leg-
islative abuse of the sin tax tool.21 While sin taxes have increased over 
                                                                                                                      
17 See id. at 22. 
18 See id. Although supporters of tobacco taxes argue the revenue is needed to offset 
the public health costs placed on society by smokers, there is disagreement as to what 
those costs actually are. See id. By one estimate, the average external costs of a pack of ciga-
rettes (such as additional medical care and reduced productivity) exceeds seven dollars a 
pack, more than the per-pack tax in any state. See id. (referencing numbers put forth by the 
Centers for Disease Control). But the Congressional Research Service, which takes into 
account in its calculations money saved on healthcare costs by smokers’ shortened life 
spans, estimates that the per-pack societal costs of smoking is only thirty-three cents. See id. 
19 See Strnad, supra note 8, at 1246–47. Strnad suggests that cigarette taxes function “as 
a powerful self-control device,” giving some smokers the extra incentive they need to kick 
the habit. See id. Strnad cites the practice of tearing up a dollar bill every time one reaches 
for a cigarette as a means of punishing oneself and training oneself not to smoke. See id. In 
effect, rather than tearing up a dollar, smokers are just giving it to the government. See id. 
20 See Baxendall, supra note 10, at 24. “Over the past several decades, with demands on 
state governments increasing and other taxes unpopular, state legislators once again 
looked to sin as a way to balance their budgets.” See id. (discussing consistent increases in 
state tobacco taxes throughout history). State lotteries, one of the most lucrative methods 
of making money from vice, bring in approximately $400 million a year, more than alcohol 
and cigarette taxes combined. See id. at 26. Baxendall states that since 2001, “the allure of 
sin taxes has grown even greater . . . as state governments, facing sudden deficits, have 
needed new sources of funds.” See id. Baxendall points to a Rhode Island measure that 
automatically raises the per-pack cigarette tax by ten cents every year, and to a recent Con-
necticut cigarette tax increase of sixty-one cents a pack. See id. During the 1990s, Baxendall 
observes, “legislators grew accustomed to the rising tax receipts . . . and committed state 
governments to higher spending levels. Some cut income taxes, tolls, or licensing fees, and 
many . . . let their rainy-day funds dwindle. When state revenues fell, states—required by 
law to balance their budgets—had to scramble to find money where they could.” See id. 
21 See Common Sense Says…, Common Sense Found., May 2002, http://www.common-
sense.org/?fnoc=./common_sense_says/02_may (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (bolstering a 
2002 argument that cigarette taxes unfairly burden the poor and are not the proper way to 
fix state budget problems by noting that, despite the belief held by supporters that ciga-
rette taxes will improve public health, “many common behaviors give physicians fits, and 
we can’t and shouldn’t tax all of them. . . . Twinkies and fast food contribute to our na-
tion’s growing obesity, which weighs on our health care system, yet no one has proposed a 
French fry tax. Can that be far behind?”); Reiter, supra note 7, at n.67 (citing several pro-
posals for sin taxes on fatty foods to encourage healthier lifestyles and replace tobacco tax 
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time, they have been generally limited to tobacco and alcohol.22 Re-
cently, a new class of sin taxes has appeared that reaches deeper into 
popular culture than ever before.23 Proposed taxes on strip clubs, 
junk food, video games, sugary sodas, bottled water, and ammunition 
would bring with them all the traditional ills of sin taxes and would 
also confuse the appropriate role of the tax system with the improper 
role of government as social engineer.24 
 This Note will argue that the use of new sin taxes must be curbed 
in order to protect the poor and working classes, who are most ad-
versely affected by each new tax. Part I will explain the basic require-
ment of fairness in taxation, and part II will supply a brief history of sin 
taxes in the United States. Part III will give an overview of the sin taxes 
that have emerged in the new millennium and will suggest that the tax 
system has reached a tipping point. Part IV will examine the reasons 
states are so quick to rely on sin taxes to fill budget gaps, and part V will 
fully discuss the harms caused by these taxes, arguing that they are inef-
ficient and bad policy, even from the government’s perspective. Part VI 
will suggest that moral policing is not the appropriate role for the tax 
system, and will suggest alternative approaches to solving state budget 
crises and ways to discourage unhealthy habits. This Note will conclude 
that where there is no system in place to monitor sin taxes’ punitive 
and detrimental effects, they are the wrong tools for discouraging un-
popular behavior. The practice of enacting new sin taxes should be 
curbed. 
                                                                                                                      
revenue when the tobacco tax finally reduces tobacco consumption, Reiter asks: “Does 
anyone see a slippery slope?”); Texas Slaps “Pole Tax” on Strip Clubs, supra note 3 (quoting 
George Washington University constitutional law professor Jonathan Turley suggesting 
that acceptance of the Texas strip club tax could “expose any unpopular industry to puni-
tive taxes. It could be abortion clinics”). 
22 See Baxendall, supra note 10, at 20. “The term ‘sin tax’ . . . refers almost exclusively 
to taxes on tobacco, alcohol, and gambling.” See id. 
23 See Gamboa, supra note 5; Sirico, supra note 5; Texas Slaps “Pole Tax” on Strip Clubs, 
supra note 3. 
24 See Muska, supra note 12 (calling sin taxes “the tool of choice for social engineers”); 
Cox, supra note 5; Gamboa, supra note 5; Sirico, supra note 5; Shapley, supra note 5; Robert 
A. Sirico, The Sin Tax Craze: Who’s Next?, The Acton Institute, Apr. 28, 2004, www.acton.org/ 
commentary/commentary_196.php (arguing that once a government begins taxing “mor-
ally ambiguous activities,” it has crossed the line into “the business of protecting its citizens 
from themselves); Skorburg, supra note 5; Texas Slaps “Pole Tax” on Strip Clubs, supra note 3. 
2009] Sin Taxes & Disproportionate Burdens 195 
I. The Fairness Requirement in Taxation 
 To generate a steady and sustainable revenue stream, a tax system 
should be structured so that it can achieve three basic goals.25 An ideal 
system will be efficient, wasting the fewest dollars possible; it will be 
simple, so that it is easy to administer; and it will be equitable.26 Equity 
in taxation comes in two forms; horizontal equity requires treating alike 
taxpayers, such as those in the same income bracket, alike, while verti-
cal equity prescribes levying taxes with an eye to taxpayers’ ability to 
pay.27 Because unfair excise taxes played an integral role in the Ameri-
can Revolution, many state constitutions, and indeed the federal Con-
stitution, were drafted to include provisions guaranteeing equality in 
taxation.28 Despite these provisions, the practical effects of modern 
American tax practices are not always fair.29 In the arena of sin taxes 
particularly, excises placed on specific goods or services disfavored by 
the majority put a disproportionate burden on minority groups.30 As 
legislatures become increasingly creative in designing sin taxes, the 
taxes target smaller and smaller groups, and any voices of protest are 
reduced to distant whispers.31 At the same time, the majority hardly no-
tices a new tax has been implemented, and so the inequities inherent 
in flat purchase point taxes do not register in the general social con-
science.32 Were new flat taxes to apply more broadly, advocates for the 
poor and disenfranchised certainly would take notice and object.33 
                                                                                                                      
25 See National Conference of State Legislatures, Principles of a High-Quality State Reve-
nue System, http://204.131.235.67/programs/fiscal/fpphqsrs.htm [hereinafter NCLS, Prin-
ciples of a High-Quality State Revenue System] (last visited Nov. 14, 2008). 
26 See id. 
27 See DePippo, supra note 6, at 562; NCLS, Principles of a High-Quality State Revenue 
System, supra note 25. The federal income tax system does match tax rate with ability to 
pay; the income tax is on a progressive rate schedule with the wealthier paying a higher 
proportion of their income in taxes. See NCLS, Principles of a High-Quality State Revenue 
System, supra note 25. 
28 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises . . . but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States”); Barker, supra note 1, at 13 (“Many state constitutions 
adopted provisions on equality, uniformity, or proportionality in tax over the course of the 
nineteenth century.”). 
29 See Baxandall, supra note 10, at 26 (citing disproportionate burden sin taxes place 
on the poor). 
30 See id. 
31 See id. (noting that groups subject to sin taxes “may resent being singled out, but 
they are a minority who garner little sympathy”). 
32 See id. 
33 See id. 
196 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 29:189 
 In his writings on the constitutional requirements of equality in 
taxation, William Barker points to the inherent selfishness of man.34 
Barker notes the influence of John Locke on early American attitudes 
towards taxation, and specifically references the strongly held beliefs 
that “there should be no taxation without representation, and that the 
burden of taxation should be equally allocated among the citizens of 
a society.”35 Barker suggests that a properly functioning democratic 
government should further these aims.36 He goes on to note, however, 
that given the opportunity, the wealthy will take advantage of any op-
portunity to shift the tax burden from themselves onto those who are 
less empowered.37 Barker observes that “this is, in general, a one-sided 
struggle” by the rich, and that in the end, “the poor always go to the 
wall.”38 Although this imbalance in financial agility—and the ability of 
the rich to avoid or evade taxation—has existed throughout American 
history, it is unfair and irresponsible to perpetuate such discrepancies 
where they can be easily avoided.39 
II. A Brief History of Sin Taxes 
 The use of sin taxes in the United States preceded the federal 
income tax system by over a century.40 Before the sixteenth amend-
ment was passed in 1913 authorizing the federal income tax, excise 
taxes were the government’s primary source of revenue.41 Initially 
implemented as temporary taxes during war time, sin taxes on alco-
                                                                                                                      
34 See Barker, supra note 1, at 3. 
35 See id. at 2 (paraphrasing John Locke, The Second Treatise on Government 193 
(Haffner Publ’g 1947) (1690)). 
36 See id. 
37 See id. at 3. 
38 Id. During Prohibition, the existing tax on alcohol, while remaining on the books, 
ceased producing revenue for the government. See Reiter, supra note 7, at 448. Historian 
John C. Burnham argues that one of the reasons the rich were in support of the repeal of 
Prohibition was because they realized a liquor tax would shift the revenue focus away from 
the income tax and place the burden back on the poor and middle class consumers of 
alcohol. See id. Reiter goes on to cite millionaire Pierre Du Pont, who suggested that the 
liquor tax would raise so much revenue there would no longer be a need for an income 
tax, “an outcome which obviously suited him quite well.” See id. at 449. 
39 See Barker, supra note 1, at 3. 
40 See U.S. Const. amend. XVI (granting Congress the “power to lay and collect taxes 
on incomes”); Reiter, supra note 7, at 446 (discussing the early history of sin taxes in the 
United States). 
41 See DePippo, supra note 6, at 546. 
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hol and, later, tobacco proved so lucrative that the government came 
to rely on them full time.42 
 Ironically, one of the causes of the American Revolution had been 
the excise taxes imposed on the colonies by England.43 Nevertheless, in 
1790, Alexander Hamilton proposed a tax on whiskey to help repay the 
new nation’s war debts.44 Despite the tax, whiskey consumption re-
mained relatively steady.45 The demand for alcohol appeared inelastic; 
people bought the same amount, no matter the price.46 Lawmakers 
took advantage of the inelasticity of demand and continued to impose 
excise taxes on alcohol.47 To make the tax more palatable to the gen-
eral public, politicians offered the justification that “sellers of such 
morally suspect products should give some of their profits back” for the 
common good.48 Similar moral reasoning has been offered to generate 
support for sin taxes throughout American history.49 
 Despite their proffered justifications, however, sin taxes have his-
torically burdened the poor.50 In the late eighteenth century, a num-
ber of poor Midwestern distillers revolted against Hamilton’s whiskey 
tax in what is popularly known as the Whiskey Insurrection.51 The tax, 
which charged small-scale producers by the gallon but which allowed 
those who produced in volume to pay a discounted flat rate, affected 
the smaller producers disproportionately.52 They rioted, and the whis-
key tax was ultimately repealed in 1802.53 The tax was reinstated as a 
                                                                                                                      
42 See id. Today, a single cigarette can yield almost eight cents for some state govern-
ments, and another two cents in revenue for the federal government. See Baxandall, supra 
10, at 20. 
43 See Reiter, supra note 7, at 446. 
44 See DePippo, supra note 6, at 545. 
45 See Reiter, supra note 7, at 446. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. 
48 See id. at 444. 
49 See Strnad, supra note 8, at 1244 (discussing taxes on cigarettes and fatty food, both 
items which are argued to be at the center of self-control issues). 
50 See DePippo, supra note 6, at 546. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. 
53 See id. Rebellions against excise taxes are not uncommon in history. See Boston Tea 
Party Ship & Museum, http://www.bostonteapartyship.com/history.asp (last visited Apr. 4, 
2008). In 1773, a group of American patriots, led by Samuel Adams and calling themselves 
the Sons of Liberty, rebelled against Britain’s Tea Act of 1773. See id. On the evening of 
December 16, 1773, a large group of patriots stormed three ships that were docked in 
Boston Harbor and emptied 342 crates of tea in to the water. See id. The tea belonged to 
the British-owned East India Company, a company which had been effectively granted a 
monopoly in the colonies by exemption from an excise tax that still applied to American 
merchants. See id. Fueled by a deep and widespread discontent with a series of commercial 
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temporary measure during the War of 1812, but was repealed again in 
1817.54 It was not until the Civil War that alcohol taxes became a per-
manent fixture on the American tax landscape, but even then, only 
liquor was subject to taxation.55 Beer and wine remained tax-free.56 
 Federal tobacco taxes also began as a temporary measure, but 
they too became permanent during the Civil War.57 As with alcohol, 
the demand for tobacco products remained high, despite the in-
creased cost to consumers.58 In 1921, individual states began charging 
their own taxes on tobacco products, levying them on top of the exist-
ing federal tax.59 Both the federal and state governments became ac-
customed to the revenue derived from tobacco taxes, and the money 
increasingly constitutes a large portion of most modern budgets.60 
III. Atop the Slippery Slope: We Have Reached  
the Tipping Point 
 A 2006 Americans for Tax Reform study of state tax trends shows 
that over the preceding two and a half decades, states moved away from 
broad increases in income and sales taxes in favor of enacting more 
targeted excise taxes.61 The new set of taxes goes beyond the traditional 
                                                                                                                      
tariffs imposed on them by England, the patriots took a stand against taxation without 
representation. See id. The Boston Tea Party was a response not only to the British tea mo-
nopoly, but to a series of unfair excise taxes that included the Sugar Act of 1764, which 
taxed coffee, sugar, and wine; the Stamp Act of 1765, which taxed newspapers, playing 
cards and other printed materials; and the Townshend Act of 1767, which levied additional 
excises on goods such as paper, paints, glass, and tea. See id. As a major rebellion against 
unfair taxation, the Boston Tea Party is known for its significance in helping to start the 
American Revolution. See id. 
54 See DePippo, supra note 6, at 546. 
55 See Reiter, supra note 7, at 447. The effect of taxing hard liquor was that many peo-
ple switched to hemp, opium, or moonshine. See id. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. at 445. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
60 See Reiter, supra note 7, at 446. In the 1950s, when cigarette smoking was at its 
height, state governments were unable to respond adequately to new medical information 
about the true dangers of smoking, due to their dependence on the revenue generated by 
tobacco taxes. See id. It was this dependence on sin tax money that prevented states from 
outlawing smoking outright, or taking bigger steps to curbing indulgence in the dangerous 
habit. See id. This moral hazard that confronts governments when they are forced to 
choose between a reliable revenue source and true furtherance of public health or welfare 
is discussed in Part V. 
61 See Sandra Fabry, Newest Sin Tax Targets: Soft Drinks, Vending Machines, Drive-Throughs, 
Budget & Tax News, Feb. 2007, available at http://www.heartland.org/publications/ 
budget%20tax/article.html?articleid=20469 (last visited Nov. 14, 2008); Daniel Clifton & 
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evils of cigarettes and alcohol, and reaches farther into popular culture 
than ever before.62 The Texas “pole tax,” for example, is one of a new 
set of modern excise taxes, recently enacted or proposed, that target 
activities currently deemed undesirable.63 In San Francisco, Mayor 
Gavin Newsom proposed a tax to be paid by the sellers of sugary soft 
drinks.64 The revenue from the soft drink tax would go to a city initia-
tive designed to encourage healthier eating and exercise.65 Kelly 
Brownell, director of the Yale Center for Eating and Weight Disorders 
has long advocated for a federal “Twinkie tax” to be levied on junk 
food, with the revenues to be funneled into nutrition and exercise pro-
grams.66 Chicago has just passed the first “eco-sin” tax, charging five 
cents per bottle on bottled water to encourage consumers to drink 
from the tap.67 In 2008, California revived a 2003 bill that proposed to 
tax ammunition because it causes gun injuries.68 And in Wisconsin, 
state senator Jon Erpenbach proposed taxing video games in order to 
raise money for the juvenile criminal justice system.69 
 Although sin taxes have always met both opposition and support, 
the arguments of the past tend to focus on alcohol and tobacco.70 
When an objector said, “but what’s next, a fat tax?” supporters were 
                                                                                                                      
Elizabeth Karasmeighan, Americans for Tax Reform, State Tax Trends over Twenty-
Five Years: Tax Increases Down, Revenue Sources Shifting 5 (2006), available at 
http://www.atr.org/content/pdf/2006/august/081406pb-statetrends%20_2_.pdf. Between 
2001 and 2005, tobacco tax increases constituted almost one third of all tax increases. See 
Clifton & Karasmeighan, supra. 
62 See Gamboa, supra note 5; Sirico, supra note 5; Texas Slaps “Pole Tax” on Strip Clubs, 
supra note 3. 
63 See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 47(B) (2008). 
64 See Jessie McKinley, San Francisco’s Mayor Proposes Fee on Sales of Sugary Soft Drinks, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 18, 2007, at A24. 
65 See id. 
66 See Muska, supra note 12. 
67 See Shapley, supra note 5. Note the circuitous irony of taxes both on sodas, to en-
courage people to be healthier, and bottled water, which at least one consumer says will 
drive her back to drinking cheaper sugar-filled drinks. See id. 
68 See Assemb. B. 2062, 2007–2008 Sess. (Cal. 2008); ‘Sin’ Taxes Create Moral Quandary, 
Religion Link, May 19, 2003, http://www.religionlink.org/tip_030519c.php. 
69 See Mark Methenitis, Wisconsin’s Game Tax - Sin vs. Luxury vs. Lunacy, Law of the 
Game, Dec. 26, 2007, http://lawofthegame.blogspot.com/2007/12/wisconsins-game-tax-
sin-vs-luxury-vs.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2008). The Wisconsin video game tax could be 
labeled a luxury tax, a slightly less stigmatizing but still problematic levy. See id. Whether it 
is labeled a sin tax or a luxury tax, it still burdens the poor disproportionately. See id. 
70 See DePippo, supra note 6, at 544 (arguing for sin taxes only on items that have an 
inelasticity of demand and focusing on alcohol); Reiter, supra note 7, at 444 (examining 
the economic and political inequities of sin taxes on tobacco and alcohol products). 
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quick to dismiss the slippery slope threat.71 Once upon a time, pro-
ponents of “serious” regulations would argue that “nobody would ever 
advocate a tax on fatty foods.”72 But in his discussion of a proposal to 
levy a sin tax on soda, Robert Murphy of the Mises Institute points out 
that some defend the taxes by saying, “We’ve done it with ciga-
rettes.”73 Murphy goes on to suggest that “beyond the injustice of 
more looting every time you buy a soda, these proposals would be yet 
more precedent of future government invasions of liberty. In twenty 
years, when someone proposes that slothful television viewing be 
regulated, some scientist will no doubt say, ‘We did it with Coke.’”74 
The threat of future government invasions of liberty has been echoed 
by economist Thomas DiLorenzo who said, “once it becomes ‘legiti-
mate’ for government to protect individuals from their own follies, 
there is no way to establish limits to governmental power.”75 Sin taxes 
are “a dangerous harbinger of an ever-expanding Nanny State.”76 
 This Nanny State may not be far off.77 As state budgets grow to 
exceed the revenue generated from the established alcohol and to-
bacco taxes, lawmakers look elsewhere to supplement the state’s in-
come.78 Paul Gessing, government affairs director at the National 
Taxpayers Union has suggested that as revenue from these traditional 
sin taxes becomes inadequate, states will seek out ways to extract 
money from smaller groups.79 As the increase in creativity and the va-
riety of sin tax proposals over the last two decades shows, states have 
                                                                                                                      
71 See Robert P. Murphy, Soda and the Sin Tax, Mar. 29, 2006, http://mises.org/story/ 
2095. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. There have been numerous proposals for taxes on fatty foods, the most 
prominent of which is Yale University Rudd Center for Food Policy and Obesity director 
Kelly Brownell’s infamous call for a national “Twinkie tax.” See Joe Nocera, Food Makers and 
Critics Break Bread, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 2006, at C1. 
74 Murphy, supra note 71. 
75 See Muska, supra note 12. 
76 See id. On CNN’s Crossfire in 2002, pro-sin tax Center for Science in the Public In-
terest director Michael Jacobson said, “we could envision taxes on butter, potato chips, 
whole milk, cheeses and meat.” See Fabry, supra note 61. Taxes on staples such as the food 
items in Jacobson’s lists would put a terrible burden on the poor who already spend a sig-
nificantly greater proportion of their income on food. See id. 
77 See Muska, supra note 12. 
78 See Skorburg, supra note 5 (citing Oakland, California mayor Jerry Brown’s 2004 
proposal for a new junk food tax that would raise money for the city). 
79 See Sandra Fabry, Reliance on “Sin” Taxes Draws Opposition, Budget & Tax News, June 
2005, available at http://www.heartland.org/policybot/results.html?articleid=17059. 
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already begun targeting smaller groups, marking the start of the slide 
down the slippery slope.80 
IV. Why Use Sin Taxes? 
A. The Path of Least Resistance 
“Taxation,” said King Louis XIV’s financial minister, Jean-Baptiste Col-
bert, “is the art of trying to pluck the most feathers from a goose while pro-
ducing the least hissing.” 
—Phinneas Baxandall81 
 Sin taxes are generally the easiest kinds of taxes to impose, and so 
they are often the first choice of lawmakers who are looking to close 
gaps in state budgets or make up deficits.82 Sin taxes appeal to voters, 
the majority of whom will not be affected by any given tax.83 Although 
they burden the poor and working classes disproportionately, they are 
indirect taxes that affect only one select minority at a time, and so they 
rarely face much opposition.84 Concern for disparity in taxation is lost 
when the tax is a sin tax.85 No one minds the small taxes on vices that 
do not affect them personally, and those who would otherwise oppose 
taxation tend to look the other way.86 The smaller or more targeted the 
group who will be affected by the tax, the less chance there is for voter 
discontent.87 Where general tax hikes were once the obvious solution 
to growing state budgets, voters in every state have taken to rejecting 
tax hikes, directly, by voter referenda, or indirectly, by voting legislators 
out of office.88 
                                                                                                                      
80 See Shapley, supra note 5; Sirico, supra note 5; Skorburg, supra note 5; Texas Slaps 
“Pole Tax” on Strip Clubs, supra note 3. 
81 Baxendall, supra note 10, at 26. 
82 See Clifton & Karasmeighan, supra note 61, at 2. 
83 See id. at 4 (arguing that “[b]y targeting their tax increases to narrower segments of 
the population, legislators divide taxpayers into smaller groups and minimize voter back-
lash”); Fabry, supra note 79. 
84 See Fabry, supra note 79. 
85 See Baxandall, supra note 10, at 26. 
86 See id. 
87 See Clifton & Karasmeighan, supra note 61, at 4. 
88 See id. at 2; Fabry, supra note 79. A number of states increased taxes during the re-
cession in 1990. See Clifton & Karasmeighan, supra note 61, at 4. In New Jersey, Gover-
nor Jim Florio (D) raised income taxes, corporate taxes, and the sales tax, and then lost his 
bid for reelection in 1993. See id. at 2. In New York, incumbent Mario Cuomo lost the race 
for governor to George Pataki, where the campaign focused heavily on recent tax increases 
in the state. See id. State-wide tax hikes can also backfire by increasing “out-migration”: the 
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 Interestingly, sin tax proposals garner much more support when 
there is a connection between the thing being taxed and the use to 
which the tax dollars are put, then when there is no such nexus.89 
Lawmakers often propose to tie tax revenue to programs intended to 
cure the ills caused by the activity at issue, although these links are 
often misguided, or are at best, attenuated.90 The Texas pole tax 
passed by overwhelming margins when the 2007 proposal included 
putting the proceeds towards supporting the victims of sexual assault; 
when an identical tax was proposed in 2004, with a plan to put the 
money into schools, the tax—then nicknamed “Tassels for Tots” —was 
dismissed as inappropriate.91 
                                                                                                                      
exodus of older and wealthier taxpayers to states with lower tax rates. See id. at 3. When 
general tax rates increase too much, those whom are most affected tend to pick up and 
move to states where the high-income bracket taxes are more forgiving. See id. In response 
to the increasing out-migration trend in the 1990s, the states cut income taxes a total of 
137 times in the second half of the decade. See id. The tax cuts reduced state revenue by 
almost $20 billion, leading many states to claim they were confronting the worst budget 
deficits since the Great Depression. See id. 
89 See Texas Slaps “Pole Tax” on Strip Clubs, supra note 3. 
90 See id. In 2003, California legislators justified a proposed ammunition tax by citing the 
costs of gun injuries. See “Sin” Taxes Create Moral Quandary, supra note 68. Although gun inju-
ries would not be possible without bullets, ammunition is hardly the sole cause of gun-related 
problems. See Gamboa, supra note 5. California would be better served by enhancing educa-
tion about gun safety or working to take illegal guns off the streets. See id. In New Mexico, 
lawmakers have proposed sin taxes on video games and televisions as part of a campaign 
entitled “Leave No Child Inside,” which aims to use a sin tax to motivate children to go out-
side and play. See id. In his article on the proposed video game tax, Gamboa points out that 
according to the Entertainment Software Association, the average gamer is a thirty-three year 
old adult, not an elementary school child. See id. Gamboa concedes that obesity is a major 
public health problem that ought to be addressed, but he cautions that a video game tax 
would be misguided. See id. Gamboa suggests lawmakers should focus their attention on par-
enting and should facilitate education on how to better raise children. See id. If legislators are 
truly concerned about childhood obesity, a better tailored approach would be to increase 
requirements for physical education in schools. See Nat’l Ass’n of Children’s Hospitals 
and Related Insts.,  Childhood Obesity Statistics and Facts (2007), available at 
http://www.childrenshospitals.net (search “childhood obesity statistics,” follow hyperlink). As 
of January 2007, Illinois was the only state with a daily minimum requirement for physical 
education. See id. 
91 See Texas Slaps “Pole Tax” on Strip Clubs, supra note 3. Despite lawmakers’ promises 
that the money from the tax will go towards helping rape victims, this is only a partial 
truth. Twelve million of the estimated forty million dollars the tax is expected to bring in 
have been earmarked for sexual violence programs—the state can do whatever it wants 
with the rest. See Ramshaw, supra note 3. In its report of a high-quality state revenue system, 
the National Conference of State Legislatures actually argues against earmarking tax reve-
nue on the grounds that rigid budgets are more susceptible to disruption and collapse 
than those where allocation of funds is more flexible. See NCLS, Principles of a High-
Quality State Revenue System, supra note 25. 
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 Reverend Robert A. Sirico, president of the Acton Institute for the 
Study of Religion and Liberty has pointed out that high taxes on disfa-
vored activities, such as smoking, drinking, and gambling appeal to vot-
ers who see the taxes as a way to discourage these objectionable activi-
ties.92 The activities being targeted also tend not to have a lot of 
organized support.93 Frequenters of strip clubs are unlikely to want 
their proclivities widely known—given the choice between protesting 
the tax for a chance to have it reduced, and keeping their strip club 
attendance private, many club-goers will choose to remain quiet and 
just pay the tax.94 Lawmakers count on this lack of vocal opposition, 
and there is no strip club lobby in Washington to persuade them to act 
otherwise.95 Across the board, activities subject to sin taxes carry (or 
acquire) a stigma that discourages consumers from objecting to the tax, 
and so these taxes slip by unchallenged.96 
B. Justifications for Taking the Path of Least Resistance 
 In order to generate voter support, lawmakers tend to offer two 
justifications for imposing a sin tax—to raise money, and to correct 
morals.97 Ironically, these justifications are at odds with one another; 
you either stamp out an activity, or you make money off of its contin-
ued consumption.98 This conflict puts governments in the position of 
having to decide whether to encourage destructive behavior in order 
to maintain the same income levels, or to come up with more creative 
ways to balance tight budgets.99 This moral hazard of governments 
indicates that legislators may not always be acting with their citizens’ 
                                                                                                                      
92 See Skorburg, supra note 5. 
93 See Baxandall, supra note 10, at 26 (observing, “smokers may resent being singled 
out, but they are a minority who garner little sympathy”); Randy Dotinga, Love the Sinner, 
Hate the Sin Tax, Wired Mag., Aug. 8, 2005, available at 
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2005/08/68433 (describing the proposal of the 
Internet Safety and Child Protection Act of 2005, and observing “the adult industry has 
zero clout in Washington and is an easy target”). 
94 See Dotinga, supra note 93. 
95 See id. 
96 See Baxandale, supra note 10, at 22 (stating that “sin taxes are levied on things that 
are fun”); Reiter, supra note 7, at 451 (observing that groups subject to sin taxes “may be 
among the few interest groups which no one dares to defend. The behavior of supposedly 
self-indulgent consumers may be demonized in order to justify balancing the budget on 
their backs”). 
97 See Reiter, supra note 7, at 444 (arguing that the policy sin taxes “reveals a constant 
tension between fiscal and sumptuary goals”). 
98 See ‘Sin’ Taxes Create Moral Quandary, supra note 68. 
99 See id. 
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best interests at heart, and is a compelling argument against allowing 
states to combine fiscal and social duties in one system.100 The moral 
hazard presented by the power to impose sin taxes is discussed further 
in Part V. 
1. The Moral Justification: When the Government Knows What’s Best 
 Paternalism can be defined as “interference with a person’s free-
dom of action out of a desire to protect that person’s welfare, interests, 
or values (as perceived by the paternalistic actor.)”101 Assume, for a 
moment, that a sin tax has truly been motivated by paternalistic con-
cern for the individual.102 In this scenario, the government’s primary 
goal in enacting the tax is to protect its citizens from themselves, and 
any revenue generated is incidental.103 To justify state paternalism, legal 
philosopher Ronald Dworkin offers the theory that each citizen is re-
sponsible for the well-being of all others and so should use his or her 
“political power to reform those whose defective practices will ruin 
their lives.”104 Critics argue this logic is flawed in at least two ways.105 
Paternalism interferes with liberty and personal autonomy, and it is also 
inefficient.106 As Dworkin notes, “life ruination” is subjective; “it is diffi-
cult to imagine whether such a life could be called ‘good’ in the sense 
of ‘beneficial’ to the person living it, if she herself did not perceive it as 
such.”107 When a government imposes on its citizens choices that they 
would not make for themselves in the name of their own welfare, their 
priorities are unlikely to change to align with their new behavior.108 
This forced shift in behavior, unaccompanied by a true shift in personal 
preference or belief, interferes with the individual’s liberty.109 As Jendi 
Reiter states, “paternalistic taxation unjustifiably restricts the individual 
liberties which are essential to mature human development and to the 
legitimacy of the democratic process.”110 She notes that “since citizens’ 
                                                                                                                      
100 See id. 
101 See Reiter, supra note 7, at 451. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. (discussing Dworkin). 
105 See id. 
106 See Reiter, supra note 7, at 452. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. at 453. 
109 See id. 
110 Id. at 444. Reiter analogizes buying to voting and points out the importance of free-
dom to make choices in American tradition See id. at 457. She notes that American tradi-
tion is grounded in the principles of democracy and a free market government. See id. 
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ability to make . . . choices is the legitimating principle of democratic 
government,” it is dangerous to assume government is acting appropri-
ately when it “promote[s] a policy devoted to creating the appearance 
of rational decision-making at the expense of true reasoned choice.”111 
Reiter argues that all citizens have a “human dignity interest” in choos-
ing their own lifestyles.112 
 Reiter also argues that paternalism is inefficient in that it is bad for 
morale.113 “Regardless of whether the subjective suffering of those 
stigmatized should constrain paternalistic policy choices, benefit to the 
community is probably insufficient to justify moralistic lifestyle regula-
tion, for a community divided by blame lacks the cohesion and com-
passions necessary to solve social problems.”114 In other words, if peo-
ple resent the restrictions placed on them by a society, they will not 
work together well to solve social problems.115 Where state moralizing 
interferes with liberty and demoralizes the individuals it is designed to 
help, it creates a new set of problems.116 Fortunately, sin taxes are never 
truly about morals.117 
                                                                                                                      
111 See Reiter, supra note 7, at 455. 
112 See id. at 456. Reiter cites Kant’s categorical imperative and states, “people should 
be treated as ends in themselves because respect for persons entails respect for their ability 
to make value decisions.” See id. at 457. Undervaluing the ability to make choice underval-
ues autonomy in general. See id. 
113 See id. at 453–54. Rather than resort to sin taxes, which are often rife with class bias, 
Reiter suggests lawmakers who are sincerely interested in curbing bad behavior and curing 
social ills should take a step back and consider the bigger picture. See id. at 454. She argues 
for considering “the social conditions which [keep] people down and [make] momentary 
gratification seem more attractive than a longer life of self-denial.” See id. “Lower-income 
people, who spend more of their income on tobacco than professionals do may feel that 
their lives and their jobs are not satisfying enough for them to prioritize long-term longev-
ity over smoking’s short-term relief from tension.” Id. “A more humane society would try to 
reduce the costs of quitting, rather than increase the costs of continuing to smoke.” Id. 
Reiter suggests that if we are truly interested in the social welfare of people who we think 
make bad choices, we should make it easier for them to make good choices, such as helping 
people to quit smoking, rather than putting burdens on the choices they currently make. 
See id. 
114 Id. at 453–54. 
115 See id. 
116 See Reiter, supra note 7, at 454. 
117 See Baxandall, supra note 10, at 24 (discussing how, while tax rates on tobacco 
products were rising in the mid-1980s, their moderate success in reducing smoking “lim-
ited the proceeds going to state coffers”). Baxandall goes on to show that when revenue 
from cigarette taxes tapers off, states turn to gambling as another funding source. See id. 
States will make money through lotteries and profit-sharing agreements with “casinos, 
riverboats, and slot machines.” See id. Casinos and lotteries are lucrative, and the taxes 
come with absolutely no pretense of aiming to reduce vice. See id. 
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2. It’s All About the Money 
 Despite lawmakers’ common contention that a given sin tax is for 
the greater good, on closer examination, these taxes reveal themselves 
to be almost exclusively fiscally motivated.118 The items subject to sin 
taxes—taxes either enacted, or merely proposed—tend to be those with 
higher inelasticity of demand.119 Historically, the federal government 
relied on alcohol and tobacco as sin tax staples; both are addictive 
goods that consumers will continue to purchase, even in the face of ex-
tremely high excises.120 Today, the bulk of new sin tax proposals focus 
on fatty foods and soft drinks.121 Food is certainly a necessity that con-
sumers will not be able to give up, and while buyers have a choice in 
the kinds of food they buy, their choices are constrained by affordability 
and influenced by convenience, and it is unlikely that junk food will 
ever disappear entirely.122 
 An examination of the legislative history of various sin taxes will 
reveal that, no matter the justifications offered to the public, sin taxes 
are enacted when states are having budget crises and need money.123 
In 2004, the mayor of Oakland, California proposed taxing alcohol 
and junk food explicitly to solve the state’s “budget woes.”124 This 
                                                                                                                      
118 See Skorburg, supra note 5. State cigarette taxes gained force as a powerful mecha-
nism for generating revenue in the 1920s. See Baxandall, supra note 10, at 26. Unlike alco-
hol, which was seen as sinful, smoking became socially acceptable following World War I. 
See id. During the War, soldiers made cigarettes—the sales of which had been banned en-
tirely in seventeen states in 1909—glamorous. See id. at 24. Soldiers were given cigarettes as 
part of their rations, and “a cigarette in the mouth became an identifying feature in patri-
otic depictions of the ‘Yank.’” See id. Baxandall states: “[T]ellingly, the first state-level taxes 
on cigarettes were not passed at the height of anti-cigarette fervor at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, but in the 1920s, when cigarettes first became socially acceptable.” See 
id. at 26. It was not until cigarette sales were significantly robust and steady that states 
deemed the activity one worth burdening. See id. 
119 See DePippo, supra note 6, at 568. DePippo cites the fact that rationales for the sin 
tax on alcohol have “come in and out of fashion over the history of the nation,” but the tax 
itself remained, even during prohibition. See id. 
120 See id. 
121 See Fabry, supra note 61; Nocera, supra note 73; Skorburg, supra note 5. 
122 See Jane Wardle et al., Sex Differences in the Association of Socioeconomic Status with Obe-
sity, 92 Am. J. Pub. Health 1229, 1229 (2002). Wardle et al. examine the reasons behind 
findings that individuals in lower-status socioeconomic groups are at higher risk of becom-
ing obese. See id. The authors note that resources available to buy food are determined by 
income, and that “low-status jobs are associated with lack of autonomy, which might make 
it more difficult for one to manage time effectively to adopt a healthy lifestyle.” See id. 
Where junk food is inexpensive and readily available, it is often the easiest choice for con-
sumers who lack the means to make more deliberately healthful purchases. See id. 
123 See Clifton & Karasmeighan, supra note 61, at 3; Skorburg, supra note 5. 
124 See Skorburg, supra note 5. 
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candid proposal prompted a surprised remark from the Cato Insti-
tute’s Radley Balko, who noted that politicians usually attribute their 
sin tax proposals to a desire to stop unhealthy behavior.125 Balko mar-
vels: “I’ve never before heard an elected official say that the real pur-
pose is to raise money. That’s a novel approach.”126 Balko goes on to 
note that sin taxes do make money for the state, and that he does not 
generally take a government at its word when officials say their pri-
mary purpose in passing a sin tax is to stop the behavior at issue.127 
“Sin taxes usually are proposed only when governments face large 
budget shortfalls.”128 Balko claims state and local governments are 
“addicted” to the revenue they generate from cigarette taxes and 
would take a hit if people stopped smoking.129 Although the Oakland 
mayor’s proposal did not materialize into law, it demonstrated that he 
thought the city needed higher taxes in some form to “put the state’s 
financial house in order.”130 The proposal met opposition from Gov-
ernor Arnold Schwarzenegger who believed California’s financial 
problems are the result of overspending, and not under-taxation.131 
                                                                                                                      
125 See id. 
126 See id. 
127 See id. 
128 See id. New York State, under Governor Eliot Spitzer, implemented a tax on illegal 
drugs which is normally enforced when drug dealers are arrested. See Delen Goldberg, 
Paying for Your Sins; Why Gov. Spitzer Wants to Raise Taxes—and Revenue—on New Yorkers’ 
Guilty Pleasures, Post-Standard (Syracuse, N.Y.), Feb. 2, 2008, at A1. Governor Spitzer also 
proposed that the state allow for more gambling, and that liquor stores be allowed to open 
seven days a week. See id. These proposals were clearly not about stamping out sin so much 
as about generating revenue for the state. See id. According to the Distilled Spirits Council, 
Sunday alcohol sales grossed over $92 million, giving the state over $14 million in sin tax 
revenue in 2006. See id. 
129 See Skorburg, supra note 5. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. Rather than jump to implement a new sin tax, legislators concerned with 
solving a state’s budget problems must look to the cause of those problems. See id. Law-
makers should determine whether the budget shortfall has actually been caused by the 
external costs of the activity they propose taxing, or whether the state is just overspending, 
generally. See id. In 2003, general fund spending in all fifty states had increased by over 
88% from 1990 levels, going from $274.7 billion a year to $518 billion. See Chris Edwards et 
al., States Face Fiscal Crunch After 1990s Spending Surge, 80 Cato Inst. Briefing Papers 1–2, 
(2003); Fabry, supra note 79. Several state governors have been cited as seeing the problem 
as one of overspending as well. See Fabry, supra note 79. In his first address to California in 
2004, Governor Schwarzenegger said: “We have no choice but to cut spending, which is 
what caused the crisis in the first place. If we continue spending and don’t make cuts, Cali-
fornia will be bankrupt.” See Skorburg, supra note 5. Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour 
(R) promised to veto a fifty-cent cigarette tax increase that passed in the state legislature in 
2005, stating that he “rejects tax increases as a matter of principle and sees the state’s 
budget problems as being on the spending side.” See Fabry, supra note 79. The state’s ciga-
rette tax would have risen from eighteen cents a pack to sixty-eight cents. See id. Governor 
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 In 2005, the Mississippi Senate considered a bill to raise cigarette 
taxes.132 Sen. Alan Nunnelee (R-Tupelo), chairman of the Senate Pub-
lic Health Committee, decided not to bring the bill for a vote, saying: 
I’m not opposed to seeing the tax on cigarettes increase as 
long as it is offset by a tax cut elsewhere. So far, the propo-
nents will not even consider a revenue-neutral cigarette tax 
bill, which I feel reveals their true motives. They want gov-
ernment to take in more money so they can spend it to buy 
constituencies.133 
In other words, if legislators really were more concerned with stop-
ping smoking than they were with raising money, they would provide 
a tax cut somewhere else to relieve the burden of a higher cigarette 
tax.134 Failure to offset new tax burdens with reciprocal relief violates 
the principles of an equitable tax system.135 
V. The Harms Caused by Sin Taxes 
 Sin taxes stray from the notion that an ideal tax system achieves 
equity by taxing people in proportion to their ability to pay.136 A sin 
tax, like any flat point-of-sale tax, will consume a greater proportion of 
a poorer person’s income, and is thus automatically regressive.137 
David DePippo points out that “after poorer taxpayers attempt to pro-
vide themselves with the basic necessities of life, they do not have any 
real tax-paying ability.”138 Elizabeth Whelan, president of the Ameri-
can Council on Science and Health has said that taxing food is an un-
                                                                                                                      
Barbour said that, “raising taxes is the enemy of controlling spending. [Between 1995 and 
2005], Mississippi tax revenue . . . increased [by] 34%, but spending . . . increased [by] 
50%.” See id. 
132 See Fabry, supra note 79. 
133 See id. 
134 See id. One state which has supplemented new sin taxes with tax cuts elsewhere is 
West Virginia. See Fabry, supra note 61. In 2006, lawmakers in West Virginia passed a group 
of bills that raised the sales tax on vending machines and sodas to six percent, while drop-
ping the food tax to three percent. See id. 
135 See NCLS, Principles of a High-Quality Revenue System, supra note 25. 
136 See DePippo, supra note 6, at 562. 
137 See Randy Balko, Back Door Prohibition: The New War on Social Drinking, 501 Pol’y 
Analysis 1, 6(2003); Skorburg, supra note 5. A regressive tax is one that causes low-income 
people to pay a larger percentage of their income in taxes than higher-income people do. 
See NCLS, Principles of a High-Quality Revenue System, supra note 25. By contrast, with a 
progressive tax rate structure, “taxes account for a higher proportion of income as income 
rises.” See id. 
138 See DePippo, supra note 6, at 563. 
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scientific way to combat obesity, noting that people in lower income 
brackets spend a disproportionate amount of their income on food to 
begin with, and adding: “food obviously supports life.”139 It should be 
noted that sales taxes are automatically at least somewhat regressive, 
as they apply to everyone at the same rate, whereas some people have 
incomes so low that they do not pay income taxes at all.140 
 Sin taxes are also regressive in the manner in which they are selec-
tively applied to only certain activities.141 It is argued that “since lower-
income citizens tend to smoke and drink more than the affluent,” in-
creases in liquor and tobacco taxes automatically place a greater bur-
den on the poor.142 Jendi Reiter and David DePippo both cite an un-
mistakable gloss of class bias in the process of choosing activities for 
taxation.143 Reiter writes: 
There is nothing about dangerous sports like hang gliding 
or skiing which promotes the Protestant work ethic any more 
than smoking, drinking, or eating Big Macs, but these risky 
amusements are never singled out for social stigmatization 
because such sports have a classier, more sophisticated image 
than smoking and being overweight.144 
DePippo echoes this idea, writing: 
One need only to look to the ‘vices’ chosen for taxation— 
smoking and drinking—to see that these activities pervade the 
daily lives of the lower classes. Activities traditionally engaged 
in by the middle and upper classes, such as skiing, are nary the 
subject of a sin tax, yet they are arguably just as physically dan-
gerous.145 
                                                                                                                      
139 See Fabry, supra note 61. 
140 See Reiter, supra note 7, at 461 (discussing the safety-net for low income taxpayers 
that is built into the income tax system via the earned income tax credit). The earned 
income tax credit is an anti-poverty tool first established in 1975, whereby working taxpay-
ers who earn less than a certain amount are eligible for a substantial offset to their social 
security taxes. See It’s Easier than Ever to Find out if You Qualify for EITC, http://www.irs.gov/ 
eitc (last visited Apr. 4, 2008). The tax credit is meant to help low-income individuals, and 
to provide incentive to work. See id. 
141 See DePippo, supra note 6, at 555; Reiter, supra note 7, at 454. 
142 See Muska, supra note 12. Robert Levy of the Cato Institute cites statistics: “more 
than half of any tobacco price increases will be paid by smokers with annual incomes un-
der $30,000; only one percent will be paid by smokers earning more than $100,000.” See id. 
143 See DePippo, supra note 6, at 555; Reiter, supra note 7, at 454. 
144 See Reiter, supra note 7, at 454. 
145 See DePippo, supra note 6, at 555. 
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In sum, poor people are more likely to consume the items being taxed, 
and in greater quantity.146 
 Sin taxes jeopardize small businesses.147 Chandra Brown, presi-
dent of Karpod Inc., one of the parties challenging the Texas “pole 
tax,” has said of the customers who frequent Players, a small Amarillo 
club, “They won’t pay it. They won’t come in. They can’t afford it.”148 
Not only have small club owners in Texas expressed concern that the 
strip club tax will reduce patronage to the point of shutting down 
business, but the tax can hurt employees as well.149 Even if they are 
not forced to close, smaller retailers and service providers whose 
businesses are subjected to a new sin tax inevitably lose customers.150 
In an interview, Elle, a 28-year old former dancer in Amarillo said she 
“worries the tax will hurt women like herself who work their way 
through college by stripping.”151 A sin tax creates a reduced supply of 
a product, driving some marginal sellers out of the market.152 If de-
mand for an item falls because the price exceeds what people are will-
ing to pay, then manufacturing slows down and people lose jobs.153 
This phenomenon could happen with anything subject to a sin tax; 
lap dances, video games, or even bottled water.154 
                                                                                                                      
146 See Muska, supra note 12. 
147 See Texas Slaps “Pole Tax” on Strip Clubs, supra note 3. 
148 See id. 
149 See id. 
150 See id. 
151 See id. Even those taxes categorized as luxury taxes—facially designed to tax the 
rich—can have destructive consequences. See Muska, supra note 12. “For example, who is 
most harmed by a luxury tax placed on an expensive car—the buyer, who presumably has 
money to spare, or the middle-class worker who builds the car only to see sales fall when 
the luxury tax curbs demand?” Luxury Tax, Investopedia.com, http://www.investopedia. 
com/terms/l/luxury_tax.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2008). One commentator described the 
Texas strip club tax as “an excellent example of the worst type of deceitful tax.” See Unfair 
Texas Strip Club Tax, Pribek.net, Dec. 22, 2007, www.pribek.net/2007/12/22/unfair-texas-
strip-club-tax. He notes that while the tax money initially comes out of the pocket of the 
customer, the individual who is affected most is “the dancer, who makes, for practical pur-
poses, all of her money from tips.” See id. After paying the fee, the customer is “sitting there 
with five less dollars in his pocket.” Id. Suggesting that this five dollars ultimately comes out 
of the dancer’s tip, he notes that she “is paying five dollars in tax for every customer.” See 
id. “You can try to solve a valid problem by [taxing] an ‘industry’ and justify the tax be-
cause that industry is unpopular to some, but in the end, all you accomplish is taxing the 
workers at the lowest rung of the ladder.” See id. 
152 See James A. Sadowsky, The Economics of Sin Taxes, Religion & Liberty, Mar.–Apr. 
1994, available at http://www.acton.org/publications/randl/rl_article_110.php. 
153 See id. 
154 See Gamboa, supra note 5; Sadowsky, supra note 152; Shapley, supra note 5; Texas 
Slaps “Pole Tax” On Strip Clubs, supra note 3. 
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 Sin taxes further create unfair competition between businesses 
located near jurisdictional borders.155 In 1998, California increased its 
cigarette tax by fifty cents a pack, marking the tax revenue for early 
childhood development programs.156 Rather than pay the tax, Califor-
nia residents who lived near the border with Nevada—a state with sig-
nificantly lower cigarette tax—merely went across state lines to buy 
cigarettes, leaving sales in California way down.157 In January 1999, a 
Reno newspaper “reported that Nevada retailers along the border 
[had] seen cigarette sales boom.”158 Previously, in 1994, Michigan 
raised cigarette taxes by fifty cents.159 The tax increase was followed by a 
twenty-one percent drop of taxable sales, while sales in neighboring 
states rose.160 
 Sin taxes can have opposite consequences from those their back-
ers originally intended.161 Instead of increasing revenue, they can re-
duce it.162 Sin tax revenue is not sustainable—economists argue that 
sin taxes work only as temporary solutions to budgetary problems.163 
As demand for a product decreases, revenue will fall, and legislatures 
will be forced either to raise taxes or impose new ones to generate the 
money they were expecting.164 
 Sin taxes can also make “morally questionable” behaviors more ap-
pealing by making them forbidden, and they can increase the external 
costs of a sin, spreading them out to society as a whole.165 Despite the 
argument that a sin tax serves to make consumers internalize some of 
the costs of their behavior, oftentimes the tax will have the practical ef-
                                                                                                                      
155 See Muska, supra note 12; Shapley, supra note 5. In his discussion of the bottled-
water tax in Chicago, Dan Shapley discusses the risk of Chicago residents going to grocery 
stores outside the city to buy water without having to pay the tax, and then buying their 
groceries while they are there. See Shapley, supra note 5. Shapley predicts that the bottled 
water tax will hurt grocery stores in Chicago in a more significant way than the law’s draft-
ers anticipated. See id. 
156 See Muska, supra note 12. 
157 See id. 
158 See id. 
159 See Sadowsky, supra note 152. 
160 See id. 
161 See Sirico, supra note 10. 
162 See id. 
163 See Ellen Scalettar & Shelley Geballe, Sin Taxes: What Are They & What Are the Benefits 
and Harms from Imposing Them?, Conn. Voices for Child., Feb. 2005, available at http:// 
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164 See id. 
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id. 
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fect of externalizing costs.166 When the price of an item increases sub-
stantially, it can induce people to shop on the black market.167 For ex-
ample, “because of high taxes, the bootleg cigarette market has thrived 
for decades in New York City, diverting millions of dollars from lawful 
businesspeople into the pockets of criminals and terrorist organiza-
tions.”168 This same risk of smuggling occurs any time alcohol taxes un-
dergo an abrupt increase.169 It is also true that the barriers to adoles-
cents obtaining cigarettes are diminished when there is access to a 
robust underground market—young people are less likely to be de-
                                                                                                                      
166 See id. 
167 See id. 
168 See Skorburg, supra note 5. New York City has the highest cigarette tax in the coun-
try. See Bruce Bartlett, Nat’l Center for Pol’y Analysis, Cigarette Smuggling, Brief Analysis No. 
423, Oct. 30, 2002. New York State imposes a tax of $1.50 per pack, and then in 2002, the 
city raised its own tax from $0.08 to $1.50. See id. In the summer of 2008, the city raised its 
own tax again, to $2.75. See Kevin Sack, States Look to Tobacco Tax for Budget Holes, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 21, 2008, at A14. This increase has brought the cost of a single pack of ciga-
rettes in New York City to over $9.00. See Jacob Gershman, Tax Hikes Seen in New York 
Budget, N.Y. Sun, Mar. 31, 2008, at 1. In the face of this exorbitant sin tax, cigarette smug-
gling in New York is estimated to cost more than $1 billion a year. See Eric Lichtblau, U.S. 
Arrests 10 as Members of Big Cigarette Smuggling Ring, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 2004, at A24. There 
are two common methods of smuggling: bringing in counterfeit brand-name cigarettes 
from Asia, and importing cigarettes from other states and labeling them with counterfeit 
stamps. See Press Release, Office of Senator Herb Kohl, Kohl, Hatch Introduce Bill to Halt 
Contraban Cigarette Trafficking Linked to Terrorist Funding, (Apr. 4, 2008), available at http:// 
kohl.senate.gov/press/060303.html; Jennifer Steinhauer, Metro Briefing New York: Manhat-
tan: Cigarette Bootlegging Charges, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 2002, at B5. In 2007, counterfeit 
American cigarettes could be found for sale from street vendors and in variety stores in 
Chinatown for approximately $4.00 a pack, approximately half of the legal price. See An-
gelica Medaglia, Cigarettes Are Costly, but Often Less So in Chinatown, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 
2007, at B2. In 2006, the New York Department of health conducted a survey of smokers in 
New York City, half of whom reported that they had purchased illegal cigarettes in the past 
year. See Medaglia, supra. In addition to lost revenue, cigarette smuggling creates other 
problems, among them increasing the availability of cigarettes to minors. See Press Release, 
NYS Tax and Finance, Brooklyn DA Extinguish Major Cigarette Smuggling Operation 
(1999), http://www.tax.state.ny.us/press/archive/1999/smuggle.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 
2008). One high school student reported buying counterfeit Marlboros because he didn’t 
want to ask his mother for the money to buy real ones. See Medaglia, supra. Cigarette traf-
ficking is also increasingly becoming a source of funding for terrorist organizations. See 
Sari Horwitz, Cigarette Smuggling Linked to Terrorism, Wash. Post, June 8, 2004, at A1. The 
underground cigarette market in New York brings crimes and gang violence to already-
overburdened urban areas, and to neighborhoods near schools. See Gregg M. Edwards, 
SOAPBOX: Of Taxation and Inhalation, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 2005, § 14NJ at 13. Fighting this 
criminal activity takes valuable police resources and places extra costs on the city. See id. 
These problems would not exist were it not for the tax policy’s criminalization of cigarette 
sales. See id. 
169 See Sirico, supra note 10. 
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terred from smoking when the state cannot monitor and regulate 
sales.170 
 One potential consequence of placing an excessive tax on some-
thing consumers refuse to give up is an increase in smuggling and re-
lated violence, as shown by the high cigarette tax implemented in the 
1980s in Canada.171 During the 1980s and early 1990s, Canadian ciga-
rette smuggling was a tremendous problem.172 Cigarettes that were 
manufactured in Canada and exported to the United States were then 
smuggled back into Canada where the original wholesalers would sell 
them on the black market for a fraction of what the state would have 
them charge, but still at a considerable profit.173 Smugglers crossed the 
border on snow mobile to avoid customs, and the situation resulted in 
considerable violence and gunplay.174 In just three months—from No-
vember, 1993 to January, 1994—Canadian police made 125 arrests for 
possession of bootleg cigarettes, and in February, 1994, the police were 
engaged in a shoot-out on an Indian reservation (where cigarettes were 
also exempt from the national tax.)175 The instant the Canadian gov-
ernment relented and cut the cigarette tax in half, the violence disap-
peared.176 
 The police power necessary to combat these underground mar-
kets is a large cost to society that lawmakers do not bargain for when 
they enact sin taxes.177 Robert Sirico observes that black markets 
form, not in response to literal price, but as a function of the demand 
                                                                                                                      
170 See Muska, supra note 12 (noting “Canada found that the thriving black market 
generated by its tax hikes made it easier for underage smokers to get their nicotine fixes—
no more shoplifting, no more fake IDs, no more waiting round in parking lots for some-
one’s older brother”). 
171 See Sirico, supra note 10. 
172 See id. 
173 See id. Legally, a case of cigarettes (50 cartons) costs $2500. See id. Smugglers would 
pay only $700 a case, and would then sell the cigarettes underground for twice that amount, 
a price still significantly below the legal price. See id. Elaborate smuggling schemes brought 
eighty percent of Canada’s exported cigarettes back into the country for sale underground. 
See id. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. 
176 See Clyde Farnsworth, Canada Cuts Cigarette Taxes to Fight Smuggling, N.Y. Times, Feb. 
9, 1994, at A3. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien announced Canada “was slashing 
taxes on cigarettes to try to stamp out widespread smuggling from the US, where taxes 
[were] about one-fifth as high.” See id. 
177 See Sirico, supra note 10. If the United States were to implement a nation-wide ciga-
rette tax like Canada’s, “tobacco would come across the borders” cheaply, somehow. See id. 
“Massive police power would have been expanded to prevent leakage,” at both the Cana-
dian and Mexican borders. See id. Sirico asserts that, “you can’t stop the growth of an un-
derground market.” See id. Sin taxes “foster disrespect for the law.” See id. 
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for a product.178 High taxes on something people are willing to do 
without will not do much damage, but even a modest tax increase on 
a product that consumers value will incite them to fight the tax.179 He 
writes: “The social consequences of even a small tax are to induce in-
formal entrepreneurs into the market.”180 By contrast, if consumers 
are able just to give up the habit, such as they might with strip clubs in 
Texas, the tax harms small business owners and their employees.181 
 In addition to creating unnecessary costs for society, sin taxes dis-
tribute the burden disproportionately even amongst users of the 
taxed products, shifting the costs incurred by a few abusers onto the 
general consuming population.182 Phinneas Baxandall points out that 
“only a fraction of those who drink abuse alcohol or suffer health 
problems, and many enjoy health benefits.”183 He goes on to observe 
that “the risks that drinkers pose to others may have less to do with 
how much alcohol they consume and more to do with how much they 
drive.”184 Not everyone should have to pay for the misuse of a few, es-
pecially when this burden falls largely on the poor.185 In his paper, 
“Back Door to Prohibition: The New War on Social Drinking” the 
Cato Institute’s Radley Balko claims that sin taxes “unfairly force all 
drinkers to pay for the societal costs” incurred by the small propor-
tion who abuse alcohol.186 He observes that “problem alcoholics are 
unlikely to stop drinking because of higher alcohol taxes, so low and 
middle income social drinkers bear the brunt of the tax.”187Although 
consumers pay a per-bottle or per-drink flat tax for alcohol, the same 
drink poses a far different risk to “a twenty one-year-old college stu-
dent whose weekly intake consists of seven beers while driving on Fri-
day night,” than it does to “a forty-year-old who drinks a beer each 
night with dinner.”188 Nevertheless, they are both charged the same 
penalty for purchasing alcohol.189 Baxandall suggests a better way to 
address the harm done to society by alcohol abuse is through criminal 
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179 See id. 
180 See id. 
181 See Muska, supra note 12. 
182 See Balko, supra note 137, at 6; Skorburg, supra note 5. 
183 See Baxandall, supra note 10, at 22. 
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185 See Balko, supra note 137, at 6. 
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187 See Skorburg, supra note 5. 
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sanctions, such as those imposed on drunk drivers.190 He further 
notes that alcohol is known to have some health benefits for moderate 
drinkers.191 Although it would be extraordinarily difficult to devise a 
tax scheme that accommodates those who are drinking for their 
health while penalizing those who’s drinking has a negative effect on 
society, a sin tax that punishes all consumers alike is inefficient and 
unfair.192 Jason Mercier, a budget analyst at the Evergreen Freedom 
Foundations has denounced sin taxes as morally wrong, insisting that 
“targeting one class of citizens to pay for the programs of another is 
. . . shortsighted.”193 
 Finally, sin taxes are punitive.194 They occasionally even impose a 
double penalty, as with New York State’s tax on illegal drugs.195 Under 
Governor Eliot Spitzer, the state imposed a “crack tax,” generally col-
lected when a drug dealer is arrested.196 The law technically requires a 
dealer to buy stamps from the government before he sells drugs— 
much like the stamps cigarette retailers are required to purchase be-
fore they put cigarettes on the shelves.197 In practice, however, once 
dealers are arrested, they are punished for not paying taxes on top of 
their punishment for dealing drugs.198 Someone arrested in New York 
with twenty-seven pounds of marijuana would owe the state approxi-
mately $43,000 in taxes.199 Ethan Nadelmann, executive director of 
the Drug Policy Alliance said: 
 These tax stamp bills and laws smack of the gratuitous pil-
ing on of punitive sanctions that permeates the overall drug 
war. . . . More than half a million people come out of prison 
each year but face daunting prospects getting a fresh start, in 
part because they are obliged to pay fines, like this tax 
stamp, that end up causing far more harm than good.200 
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192 See id. 
193 See Fabry, supra note 79. 
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Owing tens of thousands of dollars in taxes makes it harder for offend-
ers to readjust to society when they are released from jail.201 It should 
come as no surprise that the majority of convicted drug offenders come 
from disadvantaged backgrounds.202 Indeed, with the arbitrary imposi-
tion of sin taxes, the poor do “go to the wall.”203 Compared to the series 
of ills caused by sin taxes, the benefits they create are minimal.204 
VI. The Appropriate Role of the Tax System 
 Sin taxes create a moral hazard for the government, causing it first 
to label an activity as morally suspect, and then to develop a vested in-
terest in people continuing the now officially sinful activity.205 Robert 
Sirico suggests that sin taxes cause policy makers to “vacillate between 
wanting to discourage undesirable behavior and wanting to encourage 
it for revenue purposes.”206 In 2005, a bill was introduced in Congress 
that would have levied a twenty-five percent tax on internet pornogra-
phy.207 The bill, entitled the Internet Safety and Child Protection Act of 
2005, met major opposition from the religious right.208 Opponents ar-
gued that if the government stood to make money from adult websites, 
it would lack incentive to discourage the maintenance and patronage 
of such sites.209 Rick Schatz, president of the National Coalition for the 
Protection of Children and Families said, “there would be concern that 
the government would change its focus to tax pornographic materials 
rather than control production and distribution.”210 
 The moral hazard trap can be avoided if the government simply 
refrains from using the tax system to regulate morals, and leaves this 
duty to a more appropriate institution.211 Sirico cautions against blur-
ring the line between private morality and public policy.212 He contends 
the job of discouraging unhealthy or dangerous behavior “is better left 
to the traditional institutions of family, church, and school.”213 When 
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“politicians and bureaucrats” are “charge[d] with sanctioning sin in 
areas that are morally ambiguous,” they face a conflict of interest, 
whereas more traditional community institutions do not.214 Rather than 
permitting lawmakers to put themselves in the position of having to 
choose between stamping out sin and generating revenue for the state, 
the government should abstain from passing judgment altogether, and 
should not attempt to regulate legal activities on moral grounds.215 
 A more appropriate role would be to focus on controlling spend-
ing, or on how to better educate the public about the dangers of cer-
tain sinful activities.216 Revenue can be raised in a number of other 
ways, some as simple as increasing income taxes.217 If the government 
does not covertly desire a portion of the population to continue smok-
ing or overeating in order to meet revenue projections, it will then be 
better situated to genuinely help reduce participation in those activi-
ties.218 Grover Norquist, president of Americans for Tax Reform argues 
that even if one accepts obesity as a public health issue, rather than a 
personal one, “the tax code is not the place to try to solve this problem. 
The tax code should not be corrupted and used as a consumer control 
device, but solely as a means to raise revenue for necessary pro-
grams.”219 
 Sirico argues the government should regulate crime, not vice.220 
Taxing an activity such as smoking, rather than simply outlawing it, in-
dicates a judgment on the part of the government that smoking is “less 
morally justifiable” than other activities, but not so reprehensible as to 
be considered a crime.221 By contrast, robbery or murder are unambi-
guously criminal.222 Sirico argues that while there is no such thing as a 
“victimless” crime, civil authority is not the appropriate judge of all be-
havior.223 He contends that morally ambiguous activities should be left 
to those “social institutions that are often more trustworthy in deter-
mining the limits of nonviolent behavior.”224 Allowing the community 
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to regulate behavior, rather than the state, which has impure and con-
flicted interests, will alleviate the problem of moral hazard.225 
 The National Conference of State Legislatures has taken the posi-
tion that the revenue system should be economically neutral.226 This 
goal cannot be achieved if tax policy is used to make budget decision 
and to influence behavior.227 In her discussion of ways to mitigate the 
harm caused by second hand smoke, Jendi Reiter observes that there 
are plenty of ways to discourage disfavored activities that would “affect 
people equally, regardless of income” or socio-economic status.228 She 
suggests second hand smoke can be combated through exercising “pri-
vate property rights, informal social pressure, and environmental regu-
lations” as well as through education and information-spreading, rather 
                                                                                                                      
225 See Sirico, supra note 5. Some states and communities are seeking to discourage sins 
such as smoking and unhealthy eating by implementing regulations that will function in-
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than through a tax on cigarettes.229 Reiter notes that these alternative 
methods would affect all smokers equally, regardless of their income.230 
 Critics of sin taxes have proposed a wide variety of non-tax solu-
tions to the “moral” problems legislators purport to address through 
the tax system.231 In North Carolina, in 2002, the Common Sense 
Foundation proposed that the state stop subsidizing tobacco compa-
nies that sell cigarettes in foreign markets.232 The foundation claimed 
such a change would save the state over $8.7 million in lost tax reve-
nue.233 The foundation also proposed raising the corporate tax rate, 
rather than taxing the individual consumer.234 The proposal referred 
to a 1991 corporate tax increase by the North Carolina general as-
sembly during a then-budget crisis, and pointed out that the increase 
had hardly any effect on businesses.235 The foundation also suggested 
that a universal healthcare system would save the state over $1 billion 
a year.236 Elsewhere, the organization, Connecticut Voices for Chil-
dren has suggested that “to counteract the regressive nature of sin 
taxes,” the revenue generated could be used to provide tax-relief to 
low-income households.237 Sin tax revenue could go towards increas-
ing programs like the Earned Income Tax Credit or could be put to-
wards a property tax or rent credit for those who qualify.238 Other al-
ternatives include increased education, tobacco control, and anti-
smoking programs and campaigns.239 Legislatures could also provide 
tax cuts elsewhere in state budgets to offset the burden of a new sin 
tax.240 Reciprocal budget cuts would serve as an act of good faith to 
indicate a sincere desire to combat the targeted behavior, rather than 
a veiled attempt to raise money without alarming too many voters.241 
 At its most basic, states should control spending, rather than levy-
ing new taxes to make up the difference between budgets deficits and 
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income stream.242 Jason Mercier calls for a “uniform tax policy that 
treats all citizens equally.”243 He insists that lawmakers have no busi-
ness as social engineers.244 Mercier states: “Cherry picking ‘sin’ taxes 
and other revenue raising schemes deemed to be politically safe ig-
nores the most important equation in budget sustainability: spending 
restraint and prioritization.”245 
Conclusion 
 Sin taxes, for all their historical weight, are unfair to the poor.246 
They place a disproportionate burden on minority groups who, repeat-
edly, are unable to advocate for themselves for better tax treatment.247 
In a political climate where public health and smart decision-making 
are valued, there are far better ways to influence public behavior than 
through taxes.248 Although new excises may seem like an easy quick fix 
for legislators who need to balance budgets without upsetting voters, 
they are unwise policy and create more problems than they solve.249 Sin 
taxes pose problems for the government as well as for taxpayers.250 Fur-
thermore, sin taxes violate the core principle of equity in taxation.251 
 The new rush of creative sin taxes is symptomatic of a fiscal system 
that has drifted too far over the line into social engineering.252 When 
legislatures get comfortable with imposing taxes on new activities, their 
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proper role gets lost.253 A mildly controversial tax can gain popular ac-
ceptance, and can then increase incrementally until it reaches extreme 
proportions.254 With no established set of rules or guidelines to moni-
tor the growth of the system, governments will slide down the slope so 
long warned about but not truly expected.255 Governments must take 
responsibility for their spending and balance their budgets in a realistic 
way in order to prevent further abuse of the sin tax tool.256 
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